Американская военная машина. Глубинная политика, глобальная связь ЦРУ с наркотиками и путь в Афганистан - Peter Dale Scott
25. Alain Labrousse, La drogue, l’argent et les armes (Paris: Fayard, 1991), 240–44.
26. Mark Jacobson, “The Return of Superfly,” New York Magazine, August 2000, http://nymag.com/nymetro/news/people/features/3649. Cf. http://www.wanttoknow
.info/militarysmuggledheroin.
27. Valentine, The Strength of the Pack, 171; cf. 103.
28. Michael Levine, “Mainstream Media: The Drug War’s Shills,” in Into the Buzzsaw: Leading Journalists Expose the Myth of a Free Press, ed. Borjesson (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2002), 261–64.
29. William J. Chambliss, On the Take: From Petty Crooks to Presidents (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), 153.
30. Joseph J. Trento, The Secret History of the CIA (New York: Random House/Forum, 2001), 345.
31. FBI document 92-2781-1276, April 24, 1968; NSA #124-10197-10282, http://www
.maryferrell.org/mffweb/archive/viewer/showDoc.do?docId=89707&relPageId=2; FBI document 92-2781-1262, February 16, 1968; NSA #124-10205-10242, http://www
.maryferrell.org/mffweb/archive/viewer/showDoc.do?docId=128895&relPageId=2 (Roselli).
32. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 253.
33. Inspector-General’s Report on CIA Plots to Assassinate Fidel Castro, NARA #104-10213-10101, 58; cf. David Corn, Blond Ghost: Ted Shackley and the CIA’s Crusades (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 67. Corn writes that Harvey passed the keys to Roselli personally, but the CIA records indicate that Roselli, like Harvey and Shackley, was only there as an observer along with O’Connell and was unaware that Harvey and Shackley were also present.
34. House Select Committee on Assassinations, Report, 173; Peter Dale Scott, Deep Politics II: The New Revelations in U.S. Government Files, 1994–1995 (Ipswich, MA: Mary Ferrell Foundation Press, 2007), 59–63.
35. Full disclosure: In 1987, I wrote the following: “The Christic suit charges that Shackley facilitated arrangements to sell opium from the Laotian guerrillas to Santo Trafficante, and that ‘in return, Shackley’s organization received a fixed percentage of the income’” (Jonathan Marshall, Peter Dale Scott, and Jane Hunter, The Iran-Contra Connection: Secret Teams and Covert Operations in the Reagan Era [Boston: South End Press, 1987], 36). I now believe that on this point the Christic suit affidavit was unfounded and its author misinformed or disinformed by his CIA source.
36. David Talbot, Brothers: The Hidden History of the Kennedy Years (New York: Free Press, 2007), 109.
37. Corn, Blond Ghost, 85. Ed Wilson told Joseph Trento that Morales “would do anything for Shackley—from blowing up a radio tower in the Dominican Republic to paying off the drug lords. He was totally devoted to Shackley” (Trento, The Secret History of the CIA, 344).
38. Long after 1963, Morales remarked to a Harvard-trained lawyer, Robert Walton, in the presence of a third witness: “Well, we took care of that son of a bitch, didn’t we?” (Lamar Waldron with Thom Hartmann, Ultimate Sacrifice: John and Robert Kennedy, the Plan for a Coup in Cuba, and the Murder of JFK [New York: Carroll and Graf, 2006], 766–67, 808, 818–19; Gaeton Fonzi, The Last Investigation [New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press, 1993], 383–90). Walton later told BBC reporter Shane Sullivan on camera that “Morales told him ‘I was in Dallas when I, when we got that mother fucker [JFK], and I was in Los Angeles when we got the little bastard [RFK]” (Talbot, Brothers, 399). I should make it clear that I attach little or no evidentiary value to the content of Ragano’s and Morales’s alleged remarks. Like comparable statements from Howard Hunt, David Phillips, and John Martino, they may well be disinformation, like the aluminum chaff released by bombers to produce false echoes on enemy radar. What remains of interest is that all five of these men were associated with Shackley’s CIA station in Miami, and all five, in one way or another, were personally connected to the CIA’s global drug connection.
39. Theodore Shackley with Richard A. Finney, Spymaster: My Life in the CIA (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2005), 281.
40. John Prados, Lost Crusader: The Secret Wars of CIA Director William Colby (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 165.
41. Corn, Blond Ghost, 96. It may or may not be pertinent that Shackley’s first overseas service in CIA was under Lucien Conein, who as an OSS officer in World War II “had some experiences in common with many of Saigon’s Corsican gangsters” (McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 249).
42. Joseph J. Trento, Prelude to Terror: The Rogue CIA and the Legacy of America’s Private Intelligence Network (New York: Carroll and Graf, 2005), 213.
43. Susan Lynn Marquis, Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1997),156. Stilwell was serving in the Office of the Secretary of Defense as deputy undersecretary for policy.
44. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 361. Trento writes that Colby had earlier sent emissaries to Khun Sa “to see if he would join with the other armies in fighting the Pathet Lao. After he refused, Shackley orchestrated a media attack . . . and painted the Burmese warlord as the biggest heroin dealer in the world” (Trento, Prelude to Terror, 32).
45. Valentine, The Strength of the Wolf, 427. As redacted in his new book, The Strength of the Pack, Valentine’s paragraph, with no additional evidence, ends more tendentiously: “The battle ended with Khun Sa and the KMT in retreat and the CIA